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Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles
Susan Lorde Martin1
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the idea that "wealth [should not have] the monopoly of
justice against poverty' 2 has been embraced as a basic principle in the
legal system of the United States, in practice, a wealthy litigant can
often outlast, and win against, a poor opponent. If a plaintiff has a
good case but no financial resources to pursue it (and, perhaps, insuf-
ficient means to pay medical bills and other living expenses), a plain-
tiff may have no choice but to forgo the suit or to accept a defendant's
low settlement offer. A plaintiff may not be able to find a lawyer
willing to take the case on a contingency fee basis and, even if such an
arrangement were available, in most states the lawyer could not pro-
vide money for the client's living expenses.3 Furthermore, traditional
lenders have not been willing to extend loans with only potential pro-
ceeds of a lawsuit as collateral, judging such loans as too risky.4
In the last five years or so, a new financial industry has filled this
litigation void.5 There are now many small, private firms advertising
on the Internet that will give plaintiffs money in exchange for a share
1. Professor of Business Law, Frank G. Zarb School of Business, Hofstra University. A Sum-
mer Research Grant from the Frank G. Zarb School of Business supported this research.
2. JEREMY BENTHAM, Letters I & XII, in IN DEFENCE OF USURY 1-5, 117-28 (1787).
3. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e); Florida Bar v. Rue, 643 So. 2d 1080
(Fla. 1994); In re Farmer, 950 P.2d 713 (Kan. 1997); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Engerman,
424 A.2d 362 (Md. 1981); Mississippi Bar v. Attorney HH, 671 So. 2d 1293 (Miss. 1995); State ex
rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Smolen, 837 P.2d 894 (Okla. 1992); Alice L. Hageman, Neither a
Borrower, nor a Lender Be, available at www.state.ma.us/obcbbo/lender.htm (last visited Mar.
10, 2002). But see Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 445 (La. 1976) (holding
that in spite of an attorney's violating the words of the disciplinary rule that prohibits the ad-
vancing of funds to a client, the attorney did not violate "the spirit or the intent of the discipli-
nary rule ... by the advance or guarantee ... to a client (who had Already retained him) of
minimal living expenses, of minor sums necessary to prevent foreclosures, or of necessary medi-
cal treatment"); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (providing that "a lawyer may, for
the sole purpose of providing basic living expenses, guarantee a loan from a regulated financial
institution whose usual business involves making such loans if such loan is reasonably needed to
enable the client to withstand delay in litigation that would otherwise put substantial pressure on
the client to settle a case because of financial hardship rather than on the merits").
4. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2001, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/2001/01_05/b3717001.htm.
5. Id.
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of the proceeds of the litigation, if there are any. If the plaintiff loses,
the money need not be returned. The reason why this kind of ar-
rangement has only recently become available is that it has been ille-
gal in many states. A third party's support for another's litigation
violates the prohibition on champerty. This author has discussed the
relationship between the modern champerty doctrine and third party
litigation financing in other articles. 6 What is relevant is that just as
the prohibition on champerty is weakening, one court has suggested
another theory for disallowing a third party's support for a litigant in
exchange for part of the award or settlement.7 An Ohio appeals court
has held the arrangement to be a loan and not a contingent cash ad-
vance and, therefore, void, resulting in the financing company's hav-
ing "'no right to collect .. .any principal, interest or charges.'" 8
Strictly speaking, the court found the instant agreements were void
because as loans they violated Ohio's Small Loan Act, which requires
that those lending money must first obtain a license. Once it declared
the agreements void, the court did not have to decide whether the
agreements violated the usury statute. Nevertheless, it is clear that if
such agreements are loans, they are usurious under the Ohio statute
and, under similar circumstances, would be in most other states.
The next section of this article briefly reviews the prohibitions on
champerty. In Part III the article outlines the law on usury. Part IV
discusses the relationship between usury laws and third party litigation
financing. Part V presents the emergence of the new financing firms
and their benefits for plaintiffs. Part VI concludes that holding these
firms to usury law limits is wrongheaded and disadvantages plaintiffs
in their uphill battle against corporate giants. As long as there is full
disclosure, plaintiffs, who under the circumstances have access to ad-
vice of counsel, should also have access to the funds necessary to pur-
sue their cases against defendants who might otherwise force them to
forgo the litigation or to accept much less than their cases are worth.
If the plaintiffs lose, they will not have to repay anything at all; if they
6. See Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Le-
gal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57 (1999-2000); Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Law-
suits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 485 (1992).
7. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL 1339487 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 31, 2001) (unpublished opinion). The Ohio Supreme Court has agreed to hear the
appeal of the defendants Interim Settlement Financing (ISF) and Future Settlement Financing
(FSF). Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 763 N.E.2d 1184 (2002); E-mail from
Richard C. Ashcroft, President, ISF, to Susan Lorde Martin, Professor of Business Law, Frank
G. Zarb School of Business, Hofstra University (Mar. 14, 2002) (on file with author).
8. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *4 (citing OHIO REV. CODE § 1321.02).
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win, they may be better off despite having to pay back the sum ad-
vanced plus a very high premium.
II. CHAMPERTY
Champerty is an ancient doctrine describing an arrangement in
which one person, the champertor, agrees to support another in bring-
ing a legal action in exchange for part of the proceeds of the litiga-
tion.9 Common law, statutory law and public policy have prohibited
these arrangements throughout the United States.10 The prohibition
is based on longstanding fears that champertors will encourage frivo-
lous litigation, harass defendants, increase damages, and resist settle-
ment." In spite of the fears, however, exceptions to the champerty
prohibition have been commonplace because of recognition that with-
out third party support some meritorious plaintiffs would not be able
to litigate their claims because they lacked the financial wherewithal.' 2
The most notable exception to the champerty doctrine is lawyers' con-
tingency fees. A lawyer's agreement to handle a case in exchange for
a percent of the damages recovered, if any, is clearly champertous.
Nevertheless, all states in the United States recognize such agree-
ments.' 3 The open court door policy has had a preeminent place in
the United States, and the contingency legal fee has been viewed as
the "poor and middle income person's ticket to justice.' 14
A few states do not prohibit champerty and will enforce champer-
tous agreements. New Jersey has never prohibited champerty. 15 In
1997 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held in Saladini v.
9. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 6; Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48,
51 (1935); Y. L. Tan, Champertous Contracts and Assignments, 106 L.Q. REV. 656, 657 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Paul Bond, Comments, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1333-41 (2002) (providing a summary of champerty law in all fifty
states).
11. A.L.G., Note, The Effect of Champerty on Contractual Liability, 79 L.Q. REV. 493, 494
(1963).
12. See, e.g., Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits, supra note 6 and text accompanying notes
126, 132, 137, 155-59.
13. Kenneth A. Ewing, Comment, Quantum Meruit in Ohio: The Search for a Fair Standard in
Contingent Fee Contracts, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 109, 110 & n.4 (1992) (listing statutory and
common law approval of lawyers' contingency fees).
14. Tort Law in New York Today: The Capra Report, N.Y.S. B.J., Apr. 1999, at 8, 50 (quoting
David Vuernick, legal policy director of Citizen Action).
15. See, e.g., Bron v. Weintraub, 199 A.2d 625, 630 n.1 (N.J. 1964); Schomp v. Schenck, 40
N.J.L. 195 (1878) (noting that doctrines of maintenance and champerty were determined to be
"'inapplicable"' in New Jersey as early as 1792); Polo v. Gotchel, 542 A.2d 947, 949 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1987); Hughes v. Eisner, 72 A.2d 901, 902 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950); Weller v.
Jersey City, H. & P. St. Ry. Co., 57 A. 730, 732 (N.J. Ch. 1904) (asserting that maintenance and
champerty never prevailed in New Jersey as indicated in a "learned and exhaustive opinion" of
Chief Justice Beasley in Schomp v. Schenck).
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Righellis'6 that "the common law doctrine of champerty... no longer
shall be recognized in Massachusetts.' 1 7 An Arizona court of appeals
has noted that the "doctrine of champerty ... does not apply in Ari-
zona. ' 18 However, most states do prohibit champerty in some fash-
ion, for example, by statute in New York;19 in common law as a
contract defense in Ohio;20 and in common law requiring officious in-
termeddling as a necessary element in Florida.21
The litigation support firms on the Internet are clearly engaging in
champerty. They are providing funds in exchange for a share of a
settlement or verdict. Nevertheless, so far there is no recorded opin-
ion refusing to enforce their agreements on the grounds of champerty.
Even in states that prohibit champerty, most have not invalidated an
agreement on that basis in recent years, if at all. For example, the
Alaska Supreme Court, while still suggesting that its common law pro-
hibition against champerty is in effect, has not enforced it in any re-
cent case where the issue has arisen.22 Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Colorado has mentioned common law champerty,23 but has not in
recent years invalidated an agreement on those grounds. Kentucky
has a statute that declares void as champertous a contract for the pur-
pose of aiding in the prosecution or defense of a lawsuit in exchange
for any part of the thing sued for.24 Nevertheless, Kentucky too has
not voided a contract on that ground in recent years. In dicta in
199725 and 199226 the Supreme Court of Kentucky suggested that
champerty could be used as a defense, but the cases it cited for that
proposition were decided in 189527 and 1909.28 Georgia has a statute
providing that contracts contrary to public policy cannot be enforced
16. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997).
17. Id. at 1224. Barratry is maintenance that promotes groundless judicial proceedings. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 158 (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 18-1001 (Michie 1990); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-12-1 (Michie 2002).
18. Landi v. Arkules, 835 P.2d 458, 464 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
19. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 1999).
20. See, e.g., Tosi v. Jones, 685 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
21. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
22. See, e.g., Wichman v. Benner, 948 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1997) (holding that hospital's assign-
ment of its claims in malpractice action did not violate public policy against champerty and
maintenance); Deal v. Kearney, 851 P.2d 1353 (Alaska 1993) (holding that hospital's assignment
of its claims in malpractice action did not violate public policy against champerty and
maintenance).
23. People v. Mason, 938 P.2d 133 (Colo. 1997).
24. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.060 (Banks-Baldwin 1998).
25. Great W. Land Mgmt., Inc. v. Slusher, 939 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1997).
26. McCullar v. Credit Bureau Sys., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1992).
27. Wemhoff v. Rutherford, 98 Ky. 91 (1895).
28. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Maxberry, 121 S.W. 447 (Ky. 1909).
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and includes among those, "contracts of ... champerty. '' 29 However,
the Georgia Supreme Court has noted that "the delicate and unde-
fined power of courts to declare a contract void as contravening public
policy should be exercised with great caution, and only in cases free
from substantial doubt. ' 30 Apparently taking the latter very seriously,
Georgia courts have not invalidated any contracts as violative of the
statutory prohibition against champerty.
Maryland has a criminal statute, with a penalty of incarceration for
one year and a fine of $1000, which prohibits a person from soliciting,
for personal gain, another person to sue or retain a lawyer to re-
present the other person in a lawsuit.31 There has not, however, been
any reported case in which a violation of the statute was prosecuted.
Thus, prohibitions against champerty would not seem to be much of
a deterrent to litigation finance firms; however, while this legal obsta-
cle may be diminishing, another has just emerged as a significant bar-
rier if upheld. Those who analyze litigation financing have generally
accepted the notion that usury laws did not apply to the arrangements
- until an appellate court in Ohio held otherwise.
III. USURY
Usury is commonly defined as "the act or practice of lending money
at a rate of interest that is excessive or unlawfully high."' 32 The term
has been used and the practice prohibited for thousands of years: in
ancient Mesopotamia and Rome, in medieval England, in eighteenth
century Asia.33 Throughout history, money lending at any interest
rate has been treated with opprobrium because of religious or moral
beliefs34 and, perhaps in part, due to anti-Semitism.35
The history of usury laws in the United States reflects the mixed
opinions about their value. The colonies and then the states enacted
usury statutes to protect consumers from the overreaching acts of
creditors.36 However, in the mid to late nineteenth century, England
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(a)(5) (1998).
30. Foster v. Allen, 40 S.E.2d 57, 59 (Ga. 1946).
31. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 10-604(a) (1998).
32. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNA.
BRIDGED 2013 (2d ed. 1980).
33. JEREMY BENTHAM, Letter II, in IN DEFENCE OF USURY (1787); Paul G. Hayeck, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Justifications for Usury Laws, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 253, 253 (1996);
Wayne A.M. Visser & Alastair McIntosh, A Short Review of the Historical Critique of Usury, in
ACCOUNTING, BUSINESS & FINANCIAL HISTORY 175 (1998).
34. Hayeck, supra note 33, at 253.
35. JEREMY BENTHAM, Letter X, in IN DEFENCE OF USURY (1787).
36. Hayeck, supra note 33, at 256-57 (e.g., Massachusetts in 1661, Maryland in 1692, Virginia
in 1730).
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and a number of states in the United States repealed their usury stat-
utes; economists had convinced them that credit markets are competi-
tive and that usury laws inhibit economic growth and undermine
efficiency. 37 By the early twentieth century most states again had
usury laws that limited interest rates to between six and twelve per-
cent, and by 1965, every state had some kind of usury law limiting
interest rates to between six and twenty percent. 38 Today, most states,
at the encouragement of consumers groups, have statutes setting in-
terest rate limits and prohibiting usury.39 Most states, however, ex-
empt corporations from their usury statutes, permitting them to
borrow at rates higher than the legal limit.40 Most states also have
exemptions for some consumer loans.41 Critics have argued that the
variety of usury laws across and within individual states makes no logi-
cal or economic sense and is merely the result of dedicated interest
group lobbying.4 2
In most states, the elements of usury are: (1) an agreement to lend
money; (2) the borrower's absolute obligation to repay with repay-
37. Hayeck, supra note 33, at 253-56. For example, in 1869 the Texas legislature amended the
Texas Constitution to eliminate usury laws. When credit abuses arose, the legislature amended
the Constitution again to reinstate usury laws. In re Coxson, 43 F.3d 189, 191 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995).
38. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
283, 313 (1995).
39. See, e.g., Ala. Code § § 8-8-2, 5-19-3 (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010 (Michie 2001);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2208 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 13 (Michie 2001); CAL. CONST. CODE
art. XV, § 1 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-104 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2304
(2001); FLA. STAT. chs. 516.031, 687.02 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 478-2 (2001); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/39-1 (2001); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-1-102 (2001); IOWA CODE §
535.2 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401 (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.010 (Banks-Bald-
win 2001); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2924 (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 1-102, 2-
201 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 12-102 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49
(2001); MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 438.41 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 334.03 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-
17-1 (2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 408.060 (2001); Mor. CODE ANN. § 31-1-108 (2001); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 45-109 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-19 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-9
(Michie 2001); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(1) (McKinney 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2
(2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-02 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.22 (West 2001);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 272 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4806.3 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
6-26-2 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-13-210 (Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-3-16
(Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN § 7 (2001); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §347.110 (Vernon 2001);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-520 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2233 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
330.55 (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.005 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 47-6-6 (2001); Wis.
STAT. § 138.06 (2001). But see IDAHO CODE §§ 28-22-108 through 28-22-112 (2000) (repealing
the usury statute).
40. See Hayeck, supra note 33, at 274, 276 n.112 (noting that forty-three states have corporate
exemptions).
41. See Hayeck, supra note 33, at 274, 276 n.113 (noting that thirty states have exemptions for
FHA-insured home mortgage loans).
42. See, e.g., James J. White, The Usury Trompe L'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 446 (2000).
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ment not contingent on any other event or circumstance; (3) a greater
compensation for making the loan than is allowed under a usury stat-
ute or the State Constitution; and (4) an intention to take more for the
loan of the money than the law allows.43 It is the second element that
is relevant to this discussion of litigation financing. That element
means that if a debt is contingently repayable, there can be no usury.
The Supreme Court of Arizona has used the following as an example
of a debt that is contingently repayable: "Borrower says to lender:
Lend me $10 to bet on a horse race, and if the horse wins, I promise to
pay you $15 tomorrow; if the horse loses, you get nothing. ''44 Unlike
the majority of states, in Texas "a contract is usurious when there is
any contingency by which the lender may get more than the lawful
rate of interest. '' 45 Thus, under Texas law where the Constitution sets
the maximum rate of interest at ten percent per year, the lender in the
horse race example would be guilty of usury. In most states the loan
would not be usurious because of the risk of losing the entire ten dol-
lars lent. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted in 1888, "It is
settled law that when the promise to pay a sum above legal interest
depends upon a contingency, and not upon the happening of a certain
event, the loan is not usurious. '46 The Restatement of Contracts ex-
plains that "[u]sury laws do not forbid the taking of business chances
in the employment of money."' 47 Thus, when a lender takes a chance
on losing the principal entirely, receiving a return greater than the
usury law allows is not prohibited. 48 However, the Restatement also
notes that "[i]f the probability of the occurrence of the contingency on
which diminished payment is promised is remote, or if the diminution
should the contingency occur is slight as compared with the possible
profit to be obtained if the contingency does not occur, the transaction
is presumably usurious. '49 In addition, courts have held that the risk
43. See, e.g., Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 762 (2d Cir. 1975) (Connecticut law); Dopp
v. Yari, 927 F. Supp. 814, 820 (D.N.J. 1996) (New Jersey law); In re Maryvale Cmty. Hosp., Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 304 (D. Ariz. 1969) (Arizona law).
44. Britz v. Kinsvater, 351 P.2d 986, 991 (Ariz. 1960).
45. Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 30 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex. 1930), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 675 (1931).
46. Truby v. Mosgrove, 11 A. 806, 807 (Pa. 1888).
47. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 527 cmt. a, app. (2002).
48. See Britz, 351 P.2d at 991; 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 133 (1999); 91 C.J.S. Usury
§ 25 (1955); 14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1692 (3d ed. 1972).
49. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 527 cmt. a, app. (2002).
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must be substantial and there must be some greater hazard than the
mere failure of the borrower to repay.50
In general, courts do not favor a finding of usury. In New York,
''usury must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as to all its
elements and will not be presumed. ' 51 In most states the burden of
proof is on the party asserting a usury claim. 52 Furthermore, when an
agreement can be construed in two ways, one lawful and the other
usurious, in the absence of evidence "requiring" a usury conclusion,
courts generally will interpret the agreement as being lawful.5 3
Given its recognition of the contingency exception in defining loans
for the purpose of usury law, the decision of the Ohio appellate court
finding two companies, that provided funds to a plaintiff pending set-
tlement of her personal injury case, guilty of making loans was quite
unusual. The decision is noteworthy because it may have an effect on
the new litigation financing industry and eliminate a new opportunity
to level the playing field between a poor plaintiff and a rich defendant.
IV. LITIGATION FINANCING AND THE USURY LAW
The plaintiff in the Ohio case had been injured in a car accident
with an uninsured drunk driver.54 Against the advice of her attorney,
while the accident litigation was pending, Rancman, the plaintiff, en-
tered into two contracts to receive a total of $6,000 from Future Set-
tlement Funding Corporation (FSF) and another contract to receive
$1,000 from Interim Settlement Funding Corporation (ISF).55
Rancman testified that she knew the terms of the contracts.5 6 In the
FSF agreement, Rancman agreed to pay FSF $16,800 out of the pro-
ceeds of her accident litigation if the case settled in twelve months,
$22,200 if it settled in eighteen months, or $27,600 if it settled in
twenty-four months. 57 If she recovered nothing, then she would owe
50. See, e.g., Thomassen v. Carr, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1967); Diversified Enters.,
Inc. v. West, 141 So. 2d 27, 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Dublin v. Veal, 341 S.W.2d 776, 777-78
(Ky. 1960); Olwine v. Torrens, 344 A.2d 665, 667 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).
51. Fried v. Bolanos, 629 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539 (App. Div. 1995).
52. See, e.g., Ditmars v. Camden Trust Co., 92 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1952).
53. See, e.g., Dopp, 927 F. Supp. at 82; Lindsey v. Campbell, 282 P.2d 948 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1955).
54. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL 1339487, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001).
55. Id.
56. Id. at *3.
57. Security Agreement between Roberta Rancman and Future Settlement Funding Corp.
(Apr. 27, 1999) (on file with the author).
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nothing. 58 In the ISF agreement, Rancman agreed to pay $2,800 con-
tingent upon her recovering in the accident litigation. 59
Rancman made her accident claim against State Farm Insurance
under the uninsured motorist provision of her husband's insurance
policy.60 At the time, there was a question about whether or not she
was covered under the policy because she was separated from her hus-
band. 61 Nevertheless, State Farm did make a settlement offer of
$35,000.62 Whether the offer was made before or after Rancman's
agreement with FSF is unclear and was not pursued by the Ohio ap-
pellate court, although it is clear that the offer was made before her
agreement with ISF.63 Rancman eventually settled the claim with
State Farm for $100,000.64 She then sued FSF and ISF seeking inter
alia a declaratory judgment that the loan agreements were void be-
cause they were usurious.65
The magistrate conducting the usury trial proposed that the con-
tracts did violate the usury interest law, as well as the Small Loan Act,
so FSF and ISF should not recover anything or, in the alternative, the
proper repayment amount would be the principal plus eight percent
annual interest. 66 The trial court decided on the latter, and all the
parties appealed.67 The appellate court held that the agreements were
not contingent cash advances as argued by FSF and ISF, but were
loans.68 The court came to this conclusion, at least in part, because of
the testimony of the president of ISF. He testified that in deciding to
advance funds, he looks for a variety of low-risk indicators which were
present in Rancman's case: (1) a skilled attorney; (2) full access to the
litigation file; (3) client not liable for the accident; (4) serious damage
to vehicle; (5) "'bright blood' injuries"; (6) medical bills (valuing a
personal injury case at two and a half to six times the medical bills
excluding physical therapy and chiropractic services); and (7) the
value of comparable injuries as determined by a jury verdict
58. Schedule A: Capital Advance Agreement executed by Roberta L. Rancman (Apr. 29,
1999) (on file with the author).
59. Transfer and Conveyance of Proceeds and Security Agreement between Roberta
Rancman and Interim Settlement Funding Corp. (Sept. 17, 1999) (on file with the author).
60. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *1 n.1.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *3.
63. Id.
64. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *1.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *2.
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database.69 The appellate court concluded that there was no real
probability that State Farm would not pay Rancman, 70 and, therefore,
the agreements were loans because there was no contingency. The
court noted that the lowest possible interest rate on the FSF contract
was 280%, and the interest on the ISF contract was 180%. 7 1
This is the first case where a litigation funding company has been
found guilty of violating a statute in connection with making a 'loan'.
The decision suggests that the agreement in the horse race example
above might be usurious if the borrower had done his homework and
determined that one horse and its jockey were consistent winners,
while the others were consistent losers. The better the borrower was
at evaluating horses and jockeys, the more likely the agreement would
be usurious; however, one could never be sure about the winner and
that's why they run the race (or, as they say in other professional
sports where one team is clearly overmatched by its opponent, that's
why they play the game). In any particular race or game, one cannot
be sure of the outcome. The same is true in litigation: if the outcome
could be known for sure, there wouldn't be a case. The loser would
not waste its time and money litigating, but would pay what it owed at
the beginning. More accurately, if there were a level playing field,
there wouldn't be a case. In many cases, however, a well-financed
defendant, like State Farm, can afford to proceed with the litigation
and to delay in the hopes that a plaintiff without resources, like
Rancman, will be forced to give up the lawsuit, receiving nothing or
much less than the case was worth. 72 As a general matter, defendants
rarely concede liability. 73
If the Ohio court was right that there was no real contingency in the
Rancman agreements, then one would expect that she would have had
her choice of traditional lenders to lend her the money she needed for
living expenses while her litigation with State Farm was ongoing.
However, it is well known that traditional lenders will not use a pend-
ing lawsuit as collateral for a loan because they deem it too risky.
69. Id. at *2-3.
70. Id. at *3.
71, Id. at *1.
72. See, e.g., Jean Hellwege, David v. Goliath Revisited: Funding Companies Help Level the
Litigation Playing Field, TRIAL, May 1, 2001, at 14 (quoting Stephen Gillers, ethics expert and
professor of law at NYU School of Law).
73. Elihu Inselbuch, Contingent Fees and Tort Reform: A Reassessment and Reality Check, 64
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 185 (2001).
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V. LITIGATION FINANCE FIRMS AND LEVELING THE
PLAYING FIELD
The reasoning of the Ohio appellate court parallels that of critics of
lawyers' contingent fees. Those critics argue that a contingent fee is
justified only when there is a real contingency, that is, where there is
an actual risk of no recovery. 74 They complain that lawyers enter into
contingency fee agreements without considering the likelihood of re-
covery, even in situations where non-recovery is not a possibility.75
On the surface these arguments would seem to be those of consumer
groups seeking to reduce fees for poor plaintiffs, however, that is not
the case. Business groups have raised the alarm over contingent fees,
and more recently over litigation funding companies. 76
They claim that contingent fees encourage frivolous lawsuits and
create windfalls for lawyers. 77 In focusing on plaintiffs' lawyers, how-
ever, these claims ignore the benefits contingent fees and litigation
funding provide to plaintiffs vis-A-vis wealthy business defendants. 78
As Marc Galanter has noted about contingent fee criticism,
"[M]easures to protect claimants against their lawyers' misbehavior
may impair their ability to contend with the defendants. Reducing the
incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers may reduce investments in lawyering
for plaintiffs and thus increase the disparities [between plaintiffs and
defendants]. '79 Another commentator has said that "[1limiting con-
tingency fee arrangements without limiting the amount of money that
corporations can spend on their defense is one-sided .... Proposals
which limit contingency fees affect only one set of players in the civil
justice system - consumers." 80
. Similarly, protecting plaintiffs against litigation funding companies
may actually increase the advantage defendants enjoy over plaintiffs
without resources. Plaintiffs have access to the advice of counsel re-
garding agreements with funding companies. Thus, they are not mere
74. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees without Contingencies: Hamlet without the
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 30 (1989); Grant P. DuBois, Modify the Contingent
Fee System, 71 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1985, at 38.
75. Attorney Fees-Foundation Asks FTC to Restrain Use of Contingent Fee Agreements-In Re
Washington Legal Foundation Proceeding, 14 No. 6 Andrews Tobacco Indus. Litig. Rep. 6
(1999).
76. George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry: How Much Justice
Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 833 (2001).
77. Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discon-
tents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 458 (1998).
78. See id. at 469.
79. Id.
80. Daniel J. Capra, "An Accident and a Dream:" Problems with the Latest Attack on the Civil
Justice System, 20 PACE L. REV. 339, 391 (2000).
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dupes being taken advantage of by experienced business people. It
may make financial sense for plaintiffs to risk paying a large fee, plus
the principle advanced, in order to have the wherewithal to withstand
the delaying tactics of a recalcitrant defendant.
In Rancman's case, she decided to enter into the agreements with
FSF and ISF against her lawyer's advice.81 After Rancman took the
money which, perhaps, allowed her to wait the six or seven months
between State Farm's $35,000 and $100,000 offers for settlement, the
Ohio court granted her a windfall because it declared the agreements
subject to a statute about loans. If Rancman had been able to get the
money as a loan from a traditional and less expensive source, presum-
ably she would have done so. The money was not available elsewhere
because no traditional lender was as sure as the Ohio court that
Rancman would have the money to pay back a loan.
FSF and ISF are but two of the growing number of litigation finance
firms. Until now, the primary legal problem these firms have had is
getting around prohibitions on champerty. They were quite confident
that the contingent nature of their agreements kept them from violat-
ing usury laws. 82 Although Rancman, an unpublished opinion of an
Ohio appellate court, may not be the harbinger of court decisions
holding these agreements to be usurious, how these firms respond
may depend on the exact nature of their businesses and where they
and their customers are located. The chief executive officer of a New
Jersey company has said that her firm is no longer making advances in
Ohio and no one else will either. 83 She was also not making advances
in Florida because she believed the Rancman case had stopped the
Florida Bar Association from issuing an ethics opinion it had prepared
endorsing the use of litigation financing firms.84
The Florida Bar Board of Governors did, in fact, approve the ethics
opinion on March 15, 2002, which reads:
An attorney may provide a client with information about companies
that offer non-recourse funding and other financial assistance in ex-
change for an interest in the proceeds of the client's case if it is in
the client's interests. The attorney may provide factual information
about the case to the funding company with the informed consent of
81. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL 1339487, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001).
82. See Hellwege, supra note 72, at 14 (quoting Al Cone, founder of Advance Settlement
Funding).
83. E-mail from Sherry L. Foley, CEO and General Counsel, American Asset Finance, LLC
to Susan Lorde Martin, Professor of Business Law, Frank G. Zarb School of Business, Hofstra
University (Mar. 14, 2002) (on file with author).
84. Id.
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the client. Although the attorney may honor the client's valid writ-
ten assignment of a portion of the recovery to the funding company,
the attorney may not issue a letter of protection to the funding
company. 85
The Florida Bar Ethics Committee specifically made "no comment on
the legality of these transactions," citing Rancman, and noting that
"[i]f the transactions are illegal, an attorney must not participate in
the transaction in any way."'86 The Committee emphasized earlier
opinions that prohibit attorneys from personally lending money, ei-
ther directly or indirectly through an attorney-funded nonprofit cor-
poration, to clients in connection with pending litigation.8 7 The
Committee also asserted that "It]he Florida Bar discourages the use of
non-recourse advance funding companies," and that an attorney may
tell clients about them only if the attorney also discusses with clients
the costs and benefits of entering into arrangements with these com-
panies.88 Most states that have issued ethics opinions on litigation fi-
nancing firms have concluded that an attorney may tell clients about
such firms and may provide information to the firm at the client's
request.89
The LawFinance/group, based in San Francisco, describes itself as
the creator of the business of litigation financing. 90 Since 1994 it has
been funding, with amounts ranging from under $100,000 to over four
million dollars, plaintiffs who have won money judgments that are be-
ing appealed. 91 The company is also willing to fund other litigation
situations.92 This organization is unusual in that it lists on its web site
the panel of lawyers it uses for advice about the selection and evalua-
tion of cases to fund.93 Among those on a long list, which is organized
according to state, are well known lawyers in national firms as well as
a retired judge. 94 The Ohio opinion would suggest that the more
85. Fla. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 00-3 (2002).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Ariz. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 91-22 (1991); N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 666
(1994); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 91-9 (1991); Ohio Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 94-11
(1994); Va. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 1155 (1988).
90. LawFinance/group Inc., Our Mission, at http://www.lawfinance.compages/mission.cfm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
91. LawFinance/group Inc., Case Histories/Articles, at http://www.lawfinance.com/pages/
cases.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
92. LawFinance/group Inc., Our Products, at http://www.lawfinance.com/pages/products.cfm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
93. LawFinance/group Inc., Our Products, at http://www.lawfinance.com/pages/panel.cfm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2002).
94. Id.
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skilled this panel in determining the value of a case, the more likely
LawFinance/group is violating California usury law; the more incom-
petent the evaluators, the greater the firm's risk of loss and, therefore,
the more likely the fees for the cash advance are within the law, no
matter how large they are. On its web site, LawFinance/group gives
examples of four cases it has funded.95 Three of the cases resulted in
wins for the plaintiffs; one resulted in a loss to LawFinance/group of
the $70,000 it advanced to the plaintiff. As long as a financing com-
pany can show that it does lose money on some cases, that should be
enough to demonstrate that there really is a contingency when it ad-
vances funds with the prospect of not getting them back if plaintiffs
are unsuccessful in their litigation. On the other hand, the chief exec-
utive officer of another funding company, ExpertFunding.com, has
said that only two percent of the cases his company has funded have
been losers.96 After Rancman, it is likely that the officers of these
companies will be just as reluctant to publish their ratios of winners to
losers, as they are to discuss their fees. Would a court consider a two
percent chance of loss sufficient to deem the financing agreement con-
tingent, or is that chance not a substantial enough risk?
Litigation funding firms are reticent on the subject of the fees that
they charge, indicating that the amount varies depending on the par-
ticular facts of each individual case. Thus, it is hard to know whether
the percentages cited in Rancman, 280% and 180%, exemplify those
in the industry in general. 97 For example, for the three winning cases
LawFinance/group discusses on its web site, the amount advanced is
indicated, but the amount the firm got back is not. A lawyer in Flor-
ida has reported that a funding company approached a client with an
offer to advance $8,000 for a return payment, if the client's case was
successful, of $25,000.98 One writer has noted that funding companies
commonly receive gains of a hundred percent or more.99 Another has
said that lenders can triple their investment.100 Nevertheless, there
are many anecdotal stories of clients happy to pay these fees. One
such client is a woman who became a quadriplegic when a Firestone
tire blew out on her Ford Bronco. 1° 1 While she waited for her case to
95. Supra note 57.
96. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK. ONLINE (Jan. 29, 2001), available at http://
www.businessweek.com:/2001/01_05/b3717001.htm?scriptFramed.
97. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *1.
98. See Hellwege, supra note 72, at 14.
99. Id.
100. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK. ONLINE (Jan. 29, 2001), available at
http://www.businessweek.com:/2001/01_05/b3717001.htm.
101. Id.
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go to trial, Providence Inc. advanced $5000 a month to her family in
exchange for their agreeing to repay twice that amount if the suit is
successful.102 With a suit potentially worth in the tens of millions of
dollars, the plaintiff, her family, and their lawyer thought the financing
agreement was a good deal because it provided for living and medical
expenses, so that they were not forced to settle for much less than
they thought their case was worth.103 At the time they entered into
the agreement with Providence, Firestone and Ford were denying lia-
bility.10 4 That would certainly seem to indicate a real contingency, but
in Rancman, the Ohio court did not indicate whether State Farm's first
settlement offer preceded the first financing agreement and initially
there was a real question about whether State farm owed anything at
all.105
Given the disadvantage of plaintiffs without resources when they
are up against wealthy corporate defendants, it was very unwise for
the Ohio court to stretch the state's law about loans to fit around the
litigation financing situation. When traditional lending institutions
will not get into this business because they deem it too risky, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the chance of loss is real. Furthermore, there
are now so many litigation financing companies that market forces
should operate to keep their fees reasonable. Among those readily
available to anyone with access to the Internet, in addition to those
already mentioned in this article, are Advance Cost & Settlement
Funding Corp. in Pennsylvania and Florida, 1° American Asset Fi-
nance LLC in New Jersey,10 7 Capital Transaction Group, Inc.,108 Case
Funding Network, 10 9 Lawsuit Funding.com,"10 ExpertFunding.com,"'
HSAC Funding of Nevada, 112 Lawsuit Financial, LLC in Michigan," 13
National Lawsuit Funding in Pennsylvania, 1 4 Plaintiff Support Ser-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK. ONLINE (Jan. 29, 2001), available at
http://www.businessweek.com:/2001/01_05/b3717001.htm.
105. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *1 111.
106. http://www.acsfcorp.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
107. http://www.amasset.con/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
108. http://www.captran.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
109. http://www.CaseFunding.coml (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
110. http://www.cashfactory.net/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
111. http://www.expertfunding.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
112. http://www.hsacfunding.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
113. http://www.lawsuitfinancial.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
114. http://www.nationallawsuitfunding.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
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vices,11 5  Resolution Settlement Corp., 116  and RJR Capital
Resources. 117
Locating in Nevada is probably a good idea for litigation financing
firms because Nevada does not have usury laws (Idaho, New Hamp-
shire, Oregon and Wyoming also do not.). If their agreements state
that the law of Nevada will apply to the agreements, most courts
would probably apply Nevada law and uphold the agreements even if
the forum state has usury laws. Courts have held that "usury laws are
not so distinctive a part of a forum's public policy that a court, for
public policy reasons, will not look to another jurisdiction's law which
is sufficiently connected with a contract and will uphold the con-
tract." 118 The Florida Supreme Court has noted that Florida's usury
statute has so many exceptions that it cannot indicate the presence of
a strong public policy.119 The same is true of the usury statutes in
most states. Moreover, it is "a well-established rule that a provision in
a contract for the payment of interest will be held valid in most states
if it is permitted by the law of the place of contracting, the place of
performance, or any other place with which the contract has any sub-
stantial connection.' 20 In 1935 a well-known commentator wrote
that:
[T]he rule has become well settled in almost all jurisdictions, too
well settled to be changed except by statute, that if a contract is
made and to be performed in different states, and is usurious by the
law of one of these places but not by that of the other, it is gov-
erned, according to the presumed intention of the parties, by the
law of the place which makes it valid.121
Nowadays, courts do not generally focus on presumed intent, but
rather on the expectations of the parties because it is common for
intentions to be expressed in the agreement. 22 The Restatement
115. http://www.plaintiffsupport.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
116. http://www.resolutionsettlement.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
117. http://www.americancashflow.com/rjrcapital (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
118. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507, 509 (Fla. 1981); see
also Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Santoro v. Os-
man, 174 A.2d (800 Conn. 1961); Big Four Mills v. Commercial Credit Co., 211 S.W.2d 831 (Ky.
1948); Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tamerius, 265 N.W.2d 847 (Neb. 1978). But see Lyles v.
Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 393 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1965).
119. Continental Mortgage Investors, 395 So. 2d at 509.
120. Id. at 510 (citing this "'traditional' or 'federal' rule" derived from Seeman v. Philadelphia
Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408 (1927)).
121. Id. (citing Professor Beale in 2 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 347.4 (1935); see, e.g.,
Speare v. Consol. Assets Corp., 367 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1966); Cooper v. Cherokee Vill. Dev. Co.,
364 S.W.2d 158 (Ark. 1963); Ury, 38 Cal. Rptr. 376; Big Four Mills, 211 S.W.2d 831; Sievers v.
Diversified Mortg. Investors, 603 P.2d 270 (Nev. 1979); Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. H & B
Inc., 597 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1980).
122. Cont'l Mortgage Investors, 395 So. 2d at 510.
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(Second) of Conflict of Laws states: "[T]he courts deem it more im-
portant to sustain the validity of a contract, and thus to protect the
expectations of the parties, than to apply the usury law of any particu-
lar state."'1 23
It is surprising in the Rancman case that FSF apparently did not
argue that the laws of Nevada should apply rather than the laws of
Ohio. FSF is a Nevada corporation, and the agreement that Rancman
signed contained a clause stating that Nevada laws would control the
agreement.12 4 Given the law as generally applied in most states, the
Ohio appellate court should have deemed enforcing the contract more
important than applying Ohio's usury law or its related Small Loan
Act. On the other hand, the court's emphasis in a brief opinion on the
amount of money Rancman had to pay for the cash advance she re-
ceived, suggests that the court was going to invalidate the agreement
in spite of any other factors.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article does not make the case that it is necessarily a good thing
for plaintiffs without their own financial resources for medical and
general living expenses to pay back three times what they were ad-
vanced by litigation funding companies. However, it does point out
the following: (1) Lawyers in almost all states cannot advance the
funds to their clients because such advances violate professional codes
of ethics; (2) Traditional lenders will not lend funds to borrowers with
nothing as collateral except a pending lawsuit because lenders view
such loans as too risky; (3) Plaintiffs without the financial wherewithal
to have staying power in cases against wealthy corporate defendants
may be forced to give up their suits or to accept settlements for much
less than their cases are worth; (4) There are now so many companies
in the litigation financing business that they will be forced by the mar-
ket into more competitive pricing; (5) The clients of litigation funding
companies have lawyers to advise them about their borrowing agree-
ments; and (6) Litigation always contains risk - there are no sure
things.
It is this last factor that makes a court wrong when it determines
that a cash advance to be repaid with additional fees, only if the recip-
ient recovers in a lawsuit, is a loan because there is no contingency by
which the funding company will not get paid. It is the first five factors
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 cmt. b (1971).
124. Plaintiff Agreement between Roberta Rancman and Richard C. Ashcroft for Future Set-
tlement Funding Corp. (Apr. 29, 1999) (on file with the author).
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that make such a determination bad policy. The important disparity
in interest is not between plaintiffs and litigation funding companies
but between plaintiffs and defendants. There can be no justice system
when there is a vast financial discrepancy between plaintiffs and de-
fendants. Litigation financing companies, just like lawyers who take
cases on a contingency fee basis, help level the playing field. If plain-
tiffs, after receiving advice of counsel, are satisfied to pay back three
times what has been advanced, because that is the only way they can
withstand the delaying tactics of defendants and reject low settlement
offers, it is bad lawmaking for courts to void such agreements based,
ostensibly, on the lack of contingencies but, in reality, on outrage at
the cost of the advances.
The implication is not that litigation financing companies should get
a windfall for leveling the playing field for indigent plaintiffs. Never-
theless, declaring the advances of funds to be loans subject to usury
laws is unrealistic. Holding these companies to the same interest rates
as banks, that will not provide the funds at those rates, will result only
in eliminating the sole access these plaintiffs have to a fair litigation
system. Most states have business and some consumer exceptions to
their usury statutes, so this situation is certainly not unique. On the
other hand, if these companies are successful and could also be suc-
cessful charging lower premiums, perhaps banks will decide to com-
pete at their regulated interest rate. One useful area of new
regulation might be in requiring full disclosure of the fee, as a percent
of the funds advanced, if the litigation is successful. With all the rele-
vant information, the plaintiff could do a better job of comparison-
shopping for litigation financing. Plaintiffs seeking these funds are
not, however, in as vulnerable a position as many consumers, because,
almost by definition, they have legal advice available to them.
The litigation financing idea is a new business worth preserving. If
courts persist in throwing obstacles in its way, then state legislatures
may need to step in to clarify that neither champerty prohibitions nor
usury limitations apply.
[Vol. 1:85
